Abstract. -This report first shows the equivalence between several formulations of classical logic in intuitionistic logic (tertium non datur, reductio ad absurdum, Pierce's law). Then it establishes the correctness of the Gödel-Kolmogorov translation, whose restriction to the propositional case is due to Glivenko. This translation maps a formula F of first order logic to a formula F ¬¬ in such a way that F is provable in classical logic if and only if F ¬¬ is provable in intuitionistic logic. All formal proofs are presented in natural deduction.
Foreword and references
The results in here are not new, but it is hard to tell where they are properly written down and published. They are often left as exercices to the reader. These are exercices on the combinatorics of proofs, but some of the cases are not that easy for people who are new to proof theory, especially students (though we encourage everyone to try these proofs themselves).
Natural deduction is a tree-like framework for formal proofs which is naturally intuitionistic. This tree-like formulation was introduced in [10] , where NJ [2, 3] is reformulated in terms of pseudo-trees. More modern references include [4, 1] .
The translation of a formula F into a formula F ¬¬ which is intituitonistically provable if and only if F is classically provable is due to [5] (in French) for the propositional case and to [8] (in Russian, summary in French, in English in [13] ) and [6, 7] (in German) for the first order case.
The equivalence of the various formulations of classical logic in intuitionistic logic (tertium no datur, reductio ad absurdum, Pierce law) can be found here and there e.g. in [11, 12, 9] 2. Natural deduction rules Let us recall the natural deduction rules that we use throughout this report. A proof is a tree plus additional information: -the nodes are formulae -the root is the conclusion of the proof -the leaves are the hypothesis which can be:
-cancelled or discharged (if so, they are between square brackets) -free (nothing particular) -every branch (unary, binary or ternary) is labelled by a rule name. -some branches (named → e , ∨ e , ∃ e ) include an index which also appears on the hypotheses which are cancelled during the application of the rule. If the multiset of free hypotheses of a proof d is Γ and the conclusion of d is C, then d is a proof of Γ ⊢ C that is a proof of C under the (conjunction of the) assumptions Γ.
If a rule says that H is cancellable in d then any number of free occurrences of H can be cancelled (one also says discharged). The cancelled hypotheses and the rule receive a fresh new index that encodes this fact (as this information is not recoverable from the proof tree, this is why natural deductions are more than trees).
Introduction rules Elimination rules
Implication
Existential quantifier
Afterwards, no free x in C nor in any free hypothesis.
Universal quantifier
No free x in Γ.
Natural deduction is "naturally intuitionistic": formulae like ¬¬A → A or (¬X)∨X are not provable. It is equivalent to other formulations of intuitionistic logic like the sequent calculus with many hypothesis and one conclusion.
There are no rules for negation ¬X, which is treated as a shorthand for X → ⊥:
For convenience, we will sometimes write the negation rules as follows.
The reader can easily verify that given ¬A ≡ def A → ⊥, these are just instances of → e and → i where the subformula B of the → rules is ⊥.
Three formulations of classical logic
To obtain a natural deduction calculus for classical logic, one has to add a family of proper axioms (i.e. axioms other than A, that is A ⊢ A, which unfortunately complicates normalisation and the proof of the subformula property).
Tertium Non Datur
for all formula A Pierce law P ierce ((P → Q) → P ) → P for all formulae P and Q RAA can also be expressed as rule cancelling several occurrences of ¬A.
raa ′ is clearly equivalent to the axiom raa given above: using the invertible rule → i one obtains ¬¬A and then obtains A by raa above, as follows.
Given raa ′ , raa becomes derivable as follows.
[¬¬A]
4. Equivalence of the three formulations of classical logic in intuitionistic logic 4.1. Reductio ad Absurdum entails Tertium Non Datur.
-
4.3. Pierce law entails Reductio ad Absurdum. -
The Gödel-Kolmogorov translation
The not-not translation F ¬¬ of a formula F is inductively defined as follows:
¬¬ nj stands for plain natural deduction, which is intuitionistic. nk stands for classical natural deduction, that is nj enriched by one of the families of axioms given above (or all of them, since they are equivalent): tertium non datur, reductio ad absurdum or Pierce law.
Since ⊥ ¬¬ = ⊥ and ¬A = (A → ⊥), the definition of the not not translation of an implicative formula yields the following remark:
Proof. -Here is the natural deduction proof of it:
Proof. -We proceed by induction on F .
1. If F = ⊥ one has to show that ¬¬⊥ ⊢ ⊥:
If F = a we have to show ¬¬¬¬at ⊢ ¬¬at which is a consequence of Proposition 2 with A = ¬at.
, which is a consequence of Proposition 2 with A = ¬(X ¬¬ ∨ Y ¬¬ ).
4. If F = ∃x P one has to show that ¬¬¬¬(∃x P ¬¬ ) ⊢ ¬¬(∃x P ) which is a consequence of Proposition 2 with A = ¬(∃x P ¬¬ ). [ 
If
¬¬(A ¬¬ → B ¬¬ ) [A ¬¬ ] 3 [A ¬¬ → B ¬¬ ] 1 B ¬¬ → e [¬B ¬¬ ] 2 ⊥ ¬ e ¬(A ¬¬ → B ¬¬ ) ¬ i (1) ⊥ ¬ e ¬¬B ¬¬ ¬ i (2) . . . . IH B ¬¬ A ¬¬ → B ¬¬ → i (3) 6. If F = A ∧ B,A ¬¬ ∧ B ¬¬ ] 1 A ¬¬ ∧ e [¬A ¬¬ ] 2 ⊥ ¬ e ¬(A ¬¬ ∧ B ¬¬ ) ¬ i (1) ¬¬(A ¬¬ ∧ B ¬¬ ) ⊥ ¬ e ¬¬A ¬¬ ¬ i (2) . . . . IH A ¬¬ [A ¬¬ ∧ B ¬¬ ] 3 B ¬¬ ∧ e [¬B ¬¬ ] 4 ⊥ ¬ e ¬(A ¬¬ ∧ B ¬¬ ) ¬ i (3) ¬¬(A ¬¬ ∧ B ¬¬ ) ⊥ ¬ e ¬¬B ¬¬ ¬ i (4
¬¬ is provable in nj, then it is also provable in nk: indeed the rules of nj are rules of nk.
Since in nk it possible to add and delete double negations, for every formula A, both A ⊢ nk A ¬¬ and A ¬¬ ⊢ nk A hold, as an easy induction on the formula shows. Thus, a proof in nk can be constructed.
-We proceed by induction on the height of the proof in nk. Observe that the obtained nj proof has the same occurences of free variables.
The height of the proof is 0 and the proof is an axiom
The height of the proof is 0 and it is an application tertium non datur ⊢ nk
5.2.3. The hight of the proof is 0 and it comes from reductio ad absurdum ⊢ nk
We therefore have to show that ⊢ ¬¬(A ¬¬ ) → A ¬¬ , but this true by Lemma 3.
5.2.4.
The proof ends with ⊥ e . -We apply the induction hypothesis (IH) to the proof without this last rule, using the fact that ⊥ ¬¬ = ⊥.
Γ . . . . 
